Barak Obama’s excellent rhetoric does not necessarily mean excellent policies.
He cannot be blamed for his lack of experience at the international level, a thorough knowledge of world history or lack of exposure to facets of diplomacy.
His grasp of essentials of internal politics in US stood him in good stead, as well as his choice of dedicated personnel to run his election campaign. Fall outs and errors were localised, and fires could be put out quickly.
Today he is saddled with a very heavy load of past sins of omission and commission of the previous regime, confronted with the worst economic situation at home and military situation abroad.
Unfortunately he seems to have limited choice in his pick of knowledgeable, dependable, and ethical, personnel for advice and implementation.
He is still saddled with persons who were involved in creating the unpleasant situation that US finds itself in, at home and abroad.
‘Experts’ and bureaucracy who have looked on with blinkers, at the world beyond its shores still carry out assessments and draw up policies.The preconceived notions of absolute superiority in some phases of military might being equated with superiority on all fronts of warfare, diplomacy and governance still exists in the power corridors of Washington.
The AfPak policy in its present form is the result half-baked knowledge of ground realities of ‘experts’ and a bureaucracy still set in its cold war mentality of short sighted views and and mastery over ‘How to mire yourselves and lose friends’.
We shall dwell on what ails the policy makers in Washington later.
Ed:
An article by Mr Kanwal Sibal, from Mail Today will clear lingering doubts one may have on the possibility of failiure of AfPak policy.
Barack Obama is frittering away India’s goodwill
by Kanwal Sibal
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UNITED States President Barack Obama’s so- called Af- Pak strategy unveiled on March 27th is questionable on many counts. Its central thrust is misdirected, its analysis of the ground situation in Pakistan- Afghanistan flawed and it is marred by significant omissions and contradictions.
Whereas, in Obama’s words, the strategy has been prepared after wide- ranging consultations with allies and friends, it remains markedly US- centric.
If, to believe his Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Richard Holbrooke, India was consulted “ all the way”, it is unclear which elements in the strategy reflect India’s thinking.
Obfuscation
Obama dwelt heavily on the threat Al Qaida poses to the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan from its safe haven in the remote Pakistani frontier areas. That the depleted leadership of this nebulous organisation, while on the run, hounded and subject to constant surveillance, can actively plot deadly attacks against the US homeland, organise mounting operations against NATO forces in Afghanistan and threaten Pakistan’s future stretches belief. That Al Qaida can function with such devastating effectiveness from isolated and inaccessible areas, even without normal communication networks for fear of being located, defies common sense.
Does its technical wizardry and organisational genius surpass the resources available to the whole western world? If Al Qaida can, with so many handicaps, penetrate the outside world so easily, one wonders why the outside world cannot, with all its resources, penetrate its safe haven.
The threat Obama identifies comes not from the Al Qaida but the resurgent Taliban. It was the Taliban that was dislodged from power in Afghanistan, not the Al Qaida. Pakistan had aided their ascent to power in Kabul earlier and has continued investing in them as insurance for retaining its longer- term strategic influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s policy towards extremist forces destabilising Afghanistan has been a differentiated one — limited cooperation with the Americans against the Al Qaida and shielding the Taliban.
US military strikes across the Afghan- Pakistan border with “ collateral” civilian casualties, the Kabul government’s ineffectiveness, inadequate economic development, drug trafficking, the traditional intolerance amongst Pashtun tribes of foreign military occupation etc, are contributory reasons for Taliban’s resurrection.
The Taliban and their ideology long precedes Al Qaida’s emergence. This ideology, relying on terrorism to further its goals, has menaced regional security for years. Pakistan has connived at it for almost two decades by using jehadi groups for promoting terror against India. Terrorism has thus been rampant in our region much before the September 11 attack put Al Qaida on the world map. If Pakistan had not nurtured extremist religious networks for its regional goals, the menace would not have reached such unmanageable proportions today for itself and the Americans. With change in political circumstances, the US and its western partners have replaced the Soviets as the enemy. The terrorist threat to the US is but an offshoot of the culture of jehad officially encouraged in the region. The Al Qaida is riding piggyback on the Taliban, not the opposite. The Taliban are by no means the junior partner in creating the current dire situation for the Americans in Afghanistan.
There can be two explanations for Obama’s obfuscation of the deeper source of the peril emanating from our region. One, he needed to dramatise the Al Qaida threat for mobilising domestic public support for his decision to commit more American lives and resources to faraway Afghanistan at a time when the US is in deep recession. If Bush exploited the insecurities of the American public post September 11 for attacking Iraq, Obama is doing the same for his Afghanistan policy. Two, he needed to shift the spotlight away from the Taliban so that the doors of a deal with sections of these extremists are kept open, while dealing with Pakistan becomes less problematic. A pact with the “ moderate Taliban” is seen as a way out of the Afghan quagmire.
This suits Pakistan which has shown greater readiness to cooperate in eliminating the “ foreign” Al Qaida elements from its territory, but has been ambivalent in dealing with the Taliban that are viewed as “ local” reserve assets for its longer term Afghan policy. The US can build on this convergence of interests.
Strategy
Obama omits altogether the words “ jehad” or “ radical Islam” in his March 27th speech. He wants to reach out to the Muslim world, but can this be honestly done by ignoring the real fount of the menace facing all? The savagery of the jehadi groups motivated by a radical Islamist ideology is at the centre of the problem in our region, but Obama does not want to identify it by its true name. The reaching out to those Taliban elements that are not indissolubly wedded to the Al Qaida is part of this stratagem. Obama is signalling US willingness to tolerate extremist religious groups so long as they are not anti- West. Al Qaida is, so there can be no compromise with it, but the Taliban are not necessarily so and therefore overtures can be made to them. This recalls the unprincipled compromises of the Clinton years when the US, overlooking the medieval, obscurantist ideology of the Taliban, engaged with them for geo- economic reasons. Obama may well be preparing for an exit strategy for the US by having truck with the Taliban, but the need of the region for an exit strategy from the barbarity of radicalised jehadi Islam must not be overlooked.
India
The highly dangerous Af- Pak region, says Obama, constitutes an international security challenge of the highest order. He cites terrorists attacks by “ Al Qaida and its allies in Pakistan” in London, North Africa, the Middle East, Islamabad and Kabul. India is not mentioned, despite recognition of the connections between LeT and Al Qaida.
Islamabad has been singled out as a victim of terrorism but not Mumbai!! So much for a common understanding we have supposedly forged with the US on the shared challenge of terrorism! This downgrading of the terrorist threat to India marks a return to the Clinton era thinking that India is a victim not of international terrorism, but of the enduring India- Pakistan conflict over Kashmir.
Obama went overboard in his speech in projecting Pakistan as a helpless, almost guiltless victim of terrorism, in linking Pakistan’s security with that of America and identifying the aspirations of the people of this terrorist infested, madrassah- pocked Islamic Republic with those of the Americans wedded to a free pluralistic society, giving, predictably, the Pakistan military, which is at the root of the problems in the region, a clean bill of health. Worse is the bracketting of India and Pakistan in terms of culpability for teetering too often “ on the edge of escalation and confrontation”— as if we bomb Pakistani embassies abroad and send Hindu extremists to cause mayhem in Pakistani hotels.
After having accepted India as a responsible nuclear power — the basis of the nuclear deal — to then gratuitously club it with A. Q. Khanproliferating Pakistan in seeking “ to lessen tensions between two nucleararmed neighbours” reflects the reappearance of a Clintonian nuclear hang- up about India. If these are early intimations of the “ constructive diplomacy” Obama intends pursuing with India, the prospect looms ahead of the great reserve of pro- US goodwill that his predecessor built in India being frittered away quickly.
The writer is a former Foreign Secretary ( sibalkanwal@gmail.com)
Filed under: Personalities, Security, Terrorism, Views, con
